

Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MNUC, FR, PK

SUBJECT: JACOMET VISIT TO PAKISTAN RE REPROCESSING

REF: (A) PARIS 9563; (B) STATE 29304 (NODIS)

1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES JACOMET'S DETAILED REVIEW OF
VISIT TO PAKISTAN. WE SPECIALLY NOTE THAT JACOMET'S REPORT
CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REPROCES-
SING PLANT BASED ON THE CIVILIAN POWER NEEDS OF PAKISTAN.
WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT HIS SECOND CONCLUSION THAT PAKIS-
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 074901

TAN'S DESIRE FOR THE PLANT IS NOT BASED ON MAKING A BOMB
BUT ON HAVING DEMONSTRATED INGREDIENTS FOR A BOMB. WE
WOULD EMPHASIZE EVIDENCE, PREVIOUSLY SHARED WITH THE GOF
IN AUGUST OF LAST YEAR, THAT THE GOP HAS HAD A SERIOUS
PROGRAM DEDICATED TO ACHIEVING A CAPABILITY TO HAVE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS ON SHORT NOTICE. WE AGREE THAT THERE IS NO FIRM
EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO A FULL
REPEAT FULL PROGRAM WHICH INCLUDES ACTUAL FABRICATION OF
WEAPONS. HOWEVER, THEIR SECURITY MOTIVATION VIS-A-VIS
INDIA IS VERY STRONG AND LIKELY TO BECOME STRONGER IF INDIA

ACQUIRES DEEP PENETRATION STRIKE AIRCRAFT. ALSO, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE PAKISTAN MAY BE INCREASINGLY PERSUADED THAT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY WOULD ENHANCE ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST--WITH PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS FOR THAT

AREA. WE NOTE, MOREOVER, THE PAKISTANI ASSERTION TO JACOMET THAT THEY "NEED THE PLANT SOON"--A POSITION TOTALLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE STATE OF THEIR POWER REACTOR PROGRAM. NEVERTHELESS, WHETHER OR NOT PAKISTAN INTENDS TO FABRICATE A DEVICE, CREATION OF THE PERCEPTION ELSEWHERE THAT IT HAS THE CAPABILITY TO DO SO (I.E., THROUGH POSSESSING A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY TO SEPARATE AND STOCKPILE PLUTONIUM) WOULD IN ITSELF HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR REGIONAL STABILITY AND OUR MUTUAL GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES. MOREOVER, ONCE STARTED ON THE ROUTE TO ACQUIRING A WEAPONS CAPABILITY, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT PAKISTAN WILL TAKE IT TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION, AND WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE NOW AT A TURNING POINT IN TERMS OF BEING ABLE TO REVERSE OR AT LEAST SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY THIS COURSE OF EVENTS.

2. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE THAT WITHOUT CONTINUED FRENCH ASSISTANCE PAKISTAN WILL BE ABLE TO COMPLETE AND
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 074901

OPERATE THE REPROCESSING PLANT AS DESIGNED BY THE FRENCH. OUR ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT LOSS OF FRENCH HELP WOULD, AT A MINIMUM, SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY COMPLETION OF THE PLANT AND WOULD REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL DIVERSION OF SCARCE PAKISTANI FINANCIAL AND SCIENTIFIC RESOURCES TO THE PROJECT. EVEN IF THE DECISION WERE MADE TO DEVOTE THESE RESOURCES, IT IS AT LEAST QUESTIONABLE THAT PAKISTAN COULD SUCCEED IN COMPLETING AND OPERATING SUCH A SOPHISTICATED AND COMPLICATED COMMERCIAL FACILITY WITHOUT FURTHER FRENCH ASSISTANCE. IF, IN SUCH A SITUATION PAKISTAN INSTEAD TURNED TO A MORE SPECIFICALLY WEAPONS ORIENTED APPROACH TO REPROCESSING MORE IN KEEPING WITH ITS CAPABILITIES, THIS WOULD REMOVE THE CIVIL USE RATIONALE FROM THEIR PROGRAM SINCE SUCH A PLANT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE UNSUITABLE FOR REPROCESSING PAKISTAN'S POWER REACTOR FUEL, AND THUS WOULD SPOTLIGHT PAKISTAN'S INTENTIONS.

3. IN REGARD TO THE LATEST FRENCH PROPOSALS FOR MODIFICATIONS OF THE PLANT, THEY DO NOT, AS JACOMET ADMITS (PARA 9 (REFTEL A), HAVE ANY NON-PROLIFERATION ADVANTAGES OVER THE ORIGINAL PUREX PLANT AND APPEAR LESS DIVERSION-PROOF THAN THE EARLIER FRENCH COPROCESSING PROPOSAL. WE SEE NO TECHNICAL FIX TO REPROCESSING IN PAKISTAN THAT WILL SIGNIFICANTLY RELIEVE OUR NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS. WE, THEREFORE, CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT FRANCE SHOULD CANCEL OR INDEFINITELY DEFER ITS PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROJECT.

4. EMBASSY SHOULD PRESENT THE ABOVE US VIEWS TO JACOMET AND, IN ADDITION, MAKE THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS:

A. IF THE GOF AND PAKISTAN GO AHEAD WITH THE "APPARENT COPROCESSING" MODIFICATION AND TRANSFERS RECOMMENDED, WE SEE NO WAY AROUND THE GLENN AMENDMENT. THIS WILL FORCE US TO TERMINATE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY TRAINING AND WOULD PROBABLY FORCE US TO CURTAIL ASSISTANCE IN
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 074901

OTHER AREAS AS WELL AND ALMOST CERTAINLY AFFECT ADVERSELY OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS. OUR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PROGRAMS HELP TO SUSTAIN A RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN WHICH WE BELIEVE CONTRIBUTES TO THE STABILITY OF THE WHOLE REGION. A SERIOUS DOWNWARD SPIRAL IN OUR RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT VOLATILE POLITICAL SITUATION, COULD LEAD TO GREATER REGIONAL INSTABILITY AND EVEN RADICALIZATION OF PAKISTAN, WHICH WOULD BE INIMICAL TO ALL WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE REGION.

B. RECENT EVENTS IN PAKISTAN UNDERLINE THE GROWING INSTABILITY IN THAT COUNTRY. IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT HOW THE POLITICAL SITUATION MAY DEVELOP. WIDESPREAD CIVIL DISORDER IS A REAL POSSIBILITY AND A FAR MORE NATIONALISTIC AND RADICAL REGIME COULD EMERGE. WE BELIEVE THIS UNCERTAIN SITUATION COULD PROVIDE FRANCE WITH A FURTHER RATIONALE FOR CANCELLING THE PROJECT AND WE HOPE IT WILL BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN FRANCE'S DECISION.

5. FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO EMBASSY REQUEST PARA 13 (REF-TEL A) FOR INFORMATION REGARDING US EFFORTS ON BRAZIL'S REPROCESSING PLANT THAT MAY BE IDENTIFIED TO FRENCH AND WHICH MAY CONTRIBUTE FAVORABLY TO GISCARD DECISION ON PAKISTAN. EMBASSY MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS WITH JACOMET AND OTHER APPROPRIATE FRENCH OFFICIALS:

A. CONTRARY TO JACOMET'S IMPLICATION IN THE MARCH 17 REVIEW OF HIS PAKISTAN VISIT, THE US IS NOT RESIGNED TO ACCEPT BRAZILIAN SITUATION. OUR OPPOSITION TO BRAZIL'S ACQUISITION OF A REPROCESSING FACILITY HAS REPEATEDLY BEEN MADE CLEAR TO BRAZIL AND
THE FRG AND WE INTEND TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS.
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 074901

B. THE REPROCESSING ISSUE IS ON THE PRESIDENT'S AGENDA FOR HIS VISIT TO BRAZIL MARCH 29-31. AS AMBASSADOR SMITH TOLD DE LABOULAYE, WHILE WE CANNOT PREDICT EXACTLY WHAT THE PRESIDENT WILL SAY, IT IS OUR INTENTION THAT THE

NUCLEAR ISSUE WILL BE RAISED. (FYI. OUR RECORD OF THE MARCH 14 SMITH-DE LABOULAYE CONVERSATION REFERRED TO BY JACOMET IN PARA 12 (REFTEL A) STATES THAT, IN RESPONSE TO DE LABOULAYE'S QUESTION WHETHER THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WOULD BE DISCUSSED BY THE PRESIDENT IN BRAZIL, "SMITH SAID HE

BELIEVED THE GENERAL SUBJECT WOULD BE TOUCHED UPON BUT HE REALLY COULDN'T PREDICT WHAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT SAY." END FYI.).

C. IN RAISING THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN BRAZIL, WE ANTICIPATE THE PRESIDENT WILL REITERATE THE POINTS MADE BY THE SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR SMITH IN BRAZIL LAST NOVEMBER: THAT THE US IS GREATLY CONCERNED OVER BRAZIL'S PLANS TO ACQUIRE A REPROCESSING PLANT; THAT THE FAILURE OF BRAZIL TO DEFER REPROCESSING WILL LEAD ARGENTINA TO FOREGO A REPROCESSING DEFERRAL, AND THAT THIS PROSPECT WILL HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE.

D. US EFFORTS TO HAVE BRAZIL DEFER REPROCESSING HAVE BEEN INTENSE AND IN HIGH-LEVEL CHANNELS. IN ADDITION TO THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING VISIT, THE NUCLEAR ISSUE HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT GEISEL, THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA (AS RECENTLY AS JANUARY OF THIS YEAR), AND DISCUSSIONS IN BRASILIA BY MRS. CARTER, THE SECRETARY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, AND AMBASSADOR SMITH.

E. SIMILAR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH THE FRG. THE US POSITION HAS BEEN SET FORTH TO THE CHANCELLOR AND RANKING GERMAN OFFICIALS BY THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT AND SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 074901

AMBASSADOR SMITH. AS THE FRENCH ARE AWARE, THESE US EFFORTS IN BRASILIA AND BONN HAVE BEEN SO STRONG THAT THEY HAVE PLACED REAL STRAINS ON OUR RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL AND THE FRG.

F. WHILE THE GEISEL GOVERNMENT HAS NOT CHANGED ITS POSITION, INTERNAL BRAZILIAN CRITICISM OF REPROCESSING HAS DEVELOPED AND WE ANTICIPATE THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE FLEXIBILITY IN THE FUTURE. WE PLAN TO REAFFIRM OUR POSITION DURING THE REMAINING MONTHS OF THE GEISEL ADMINISTRATION, AND TO RENEW OUR EFFORTS WITH ITS SUCCESSOR.

G. US EFFORTS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFINED TO BRAZIL AND THE FRG. AS THE FRENCH ARE AWARE (REFTEL B), WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE DUTCH OUR CONCERNS THAT A URENCO-BRAZIL PLUTONIUM STORAGE REGIME COULD SERVE TO LEGITIMIZE PREMATURELY BRAZIL'S ACQUISITION OF REPROCESSING CAPABILITIES, AS WELL AS THAT OF OTHER STATES. WE HAVE TOLD THE DUTCH THAT IF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT CAME BEFORE THE IAEA

BOARD AT THIS TIME WE WOULD MOST LIKELY BE UNABLE TO SUPPORT IT. AT NO TIME HAVE WE AGREED TO ANY PLUTONIUM STORAGE REGIME IN BRAZIL.

H. FYI. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT JACOMET'S COMMENT

PARA 12 (REFTEL A), "IF THE US IS RESIGNED TO ACCEPT THE BRAZILIAN SITUATION, WHY SHOULD FRANCE EXTEND ITSELF TO FULL CANCELLATION OF THE (PAKISTAN) PLANT" OVERLOOKS A SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR RESPECTIVE ROLES. IN THE CASE OF BRAZIL'S REPROCESSING PLANS, WE ARE NOT A PARTY TO BRAZIL'S CONTRACT. AS A RESULT, IT IS NOT IN OUR POWER TO CANCEL OR DEFER THAT CONTRACT. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE AND WILL CONTINUE DOING EVERYTHING FEASIBLE ON
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 074901

THE BRAZIL SITUATION. END FYI.

6. IN SUMMARY, WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT CANCELLATION OF THE PAKISTAN CONTRACT OFFERS THE BEST HOPE OF PREVENTING OR AT LEAST DELAYING PAKISTAN'S ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. WE URGE FRANCE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TERMINATE THE CONTRACT.

7. DR. NYE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH JACOMET AND OTHERS IN PARIS NEXT WEEK. VANCE

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